Nixon And Brezhnev Reached Agreement On
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This agreement paved the way for further discussions on international cooperation and the limitation of nuclear weapons, as seen by both the SALT II Treaty and the 1973 Washington Summit. Nixon was proud to have reached an agreement through his diplomatic capabilities that his predecessors failed to reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente and other pressing issues through what Nixon called the “link.” David Tal argues that at a meeting at the Soviet Embassy on January 9, 1971, about a month before the first recorded conversation on SALT, Kissinger suggested that the United States would accept an ABM agreement if it was related to the Soviet obligation to continue working on offensive restrictions. There would be a freeze on new departures of ICBMs until a formal agreement is reached on the limitation of offensive weapons. The United States would later submit a new proposal on the SLBMs. The agreement on this basic framework for SALT should be expressed through an exchange of letters between Nixon and Soviet leaders. The details of the treaties or final agreements would then be drawn up as part of the formal SALT negotiations. If all goes well, both sides would sign the final documents at a US-Soviet summit in Moscow in the autumn. When President Nixon arrived in Moscow on May 22, 1972, the likely outcomes of his trip were virtually predictable. Although the existence of the US-Soviet summit proved that the two governments were ready to engage in a new dialogue, most remained skeptical of the possibility of agreements at the planned meetings. At the end of April 1971, Mr.
Nixon`s president announced that the Soviets had finally accepted, through the back channel, the fundamentals of a common commitment to move forward on SALT. The United States and the Soviet Union would reach an interim agreement to end the use of strategic offensive weapons. This agreement would be accompanied by an indeterminate contract to limit ABM plans. Nevertheless, there were still many details to be developed, such as when the offensive freeze would begin and end (until a more permanent agreement), what types of assault weapons would be covered and how many ABM systems would be allowed on both sides. Kissinger expected that the technical details would be resolved later by the formal SALT negotiations in Vienna and Helsinki, but that an announcement of the breakthrough could be made in the coming weeks, with perhaps the commitment of a Soviet US summit in the autumn (interview 487-021, extracted from PRDE A; and Conversation 489-017, extracted PRDE A). From that date on, discussions at the White House on SALT will be much longer, more focused and more detailed. While Kissinger was trying to paste the text of public and private messages on SALT, another important foreign policy issue was resolved in Washington. The U.S.
Senate had debated a number of proposals regarding U.S. military commitments in Europe, in particular Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield`s bill to halve U.S. military strength. The two topics – SALT and Mansfield Amendment – were entangled in oval office discussions throughout May. The White House had strongly opposed the troop reduction mandate and Nixon felt confirmed when the Mansfield amendment was rejected at 69:31 on May 19. In the Oval Office discussions before the vote, Nixon showed no propensity to take advantage of the impending announcement of progress in the salt negotiations to influence the Senate debate. He did not inform the main senators of SALT`s possible breakthrough or attempted to delay the vote to strengthen his political position (Interview 500-010, EXTRAIT PRDE A). Nixon seems to want to preserve the dramatic effect of SALT`s announcement at all costs.
Nixon was no doubt concerned that the collapse of the last-minute agreement on the salt-back channel, if known, would jeopardize his political influence in the Senate.
